The GATT has not pressed hard for policy liberalization by the less developed countries in previous
market trade. Tomek and Robinson (1981) refer to The domestic quota limits the amount of peanuts these conditions as third degree price discrimination.
that can be sold in the domestic market at the support At least since 1977 the principal sub-markets for price, but places no limits on production. Total pro-U.S. peanuts, broadly classified as domestic edible, duction of peanuts adjusts to world conditions. Imexport edible, and domestic oil, have generally been portant CCC rules govern trade and affect the price independent. The flow of U.S. peanuts to these mardiscovery process. Two of the most important conkets is described in Figure 1 . Independence is ditions are (1) the deadline, September 15, for peanut achieved primarily through application of Section 22 buyers to forward contract with farmers, and (2) the of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as CCC minimum resale price for peanuts stocks acamended in 1935, and various trading rules of the quired from farmers who do not sign forward conFarm Bills of 1977 , 1981 , and 1985 tracts. Peanuts grown in excess of domestic quota are approved by the GATT in 1955, prohibits import of designated as additional peanuts and are normally peanuts into the U.S. economy except for research sold in the export market on contracts signed with and development purposes (1.7 million pounds curfarmers prior to September 15. This rule also extends rently).
2 Most recent Commodity Credit Corporation to export products, such as peanut butter, which may (CCC) rules prescribe that U.S. peanuts marketed for be produced in the United States using additional domestic use in excess of domestic quota shall be peanuts. Additional peanuts not contracted for sale subject to a penalty of 140 percent of the quota price prior to September 15 must be delivered to the CCC. support rate. The penalty price is a high level of price CCC stocks may be sold for export at a minimum discrimination but provides an acceptable marketing resale price, or they may be sold for unrestricted use alternative in circumstances of short supply. A in crushing. A little used, but potentially important, drought could, for example, push prices to point A rule is that additional peanuts may be bought from in Figure 2 .
the CCC for use in the domestic market. These The cornerstone of market segregation and subpeanuts, known as buybacks, have the potential to sequent price discrimination policy is the quota supraise domestic consumption above the domestic port price for domestic peanuts. To be successful, quota. Farmers receive a share of profits from CCC this price must be set at a point (say, point B in Figure  resale of peanuts but are not liable for losses. 2) on the aggregate U.S. farm level demand curve for
The logic of the buyback relates to the possibility peanuts corresponding to U.S. edible consumption of setting the domestic quota too low. A low domes-(peanut butter, confections, and seed) with perhaps tic quota would pressure domestic prices to rise, a small margin for shortfalls in delivery. Setting this reduce export contracts, and increase the likelihood quota too low with respect to the support price will that additionals delivered to CCC might be bought cause a loss of buffer stocks and a subsequent rise in back for domestic use. Dubman and Miller have domestic market price above the support level.
discussed the negative impact this would have on Figure 1 . Major Market Channels in the U.S. Peanut Market Note: A sheller and a buying point may be the same. Other potential channels are highly restricted by import quota, export constraints on dumping peanuts on the world market in the form of oil, constraints on re-importing export peanuts (including penalties), and constraints on the CCC as a competitor enterprise in the marketing channl. Shellers and domestic processors hold inventories, but inventory change is not a major flow in most years. -1989) . Because the first source plainly yields little crease in domestic consumption using buybacks is information on the effects of peanut policy, the reevidence that the current level of the domestic quota mainder of this report examines the effects of market is too low for efficient operation of the program. The discrimination on the world market for peanuts. buyback is a virtual litmus test of whether the quota A PSE price wedge calculated as the difference and support price are at the right point (say, B in between the world price and the U.S. price will Figure 2 ) on the domestic market demand curve.
overestimate the value of the producer subsidy. The Domestic price support is carried out primarily United States acts as a price leader in the world through non-recourse, warehouse-storage loans to market. If U.S. export prices are subsidized they approved grower associations acting for farmers.
would likely rise if the program were dissolved, thus Setting the quota and support prices correctly in leading to a rise in world prices. Although the United relation to domestic demand will make it inefficient
States produces only about 10 percent of world to deliver domestic peanuts for CCC storage. Shelpeanut production, in recent years it has claimed lers will find it efficient to pay farmers the price about 35 percent of the market for world exports.
3 support or a higher price, depending on scarcity of Thus, it is not possible to observe an independent shelled grades required in sheller forward contracts, world reference price as theoretically required to to avoid paying interest and carrying charges reconstruct price wedges using the conventional quired to buy peanuts from the loan program. Thus, PSE/CSE methodology. PSE and CSE estimates little or no government costs are expected, and costs should be made from estimates of the price wedges have been low in recent years.
between observed prices and expected world equiPeanut oil can be imported by the United States but librium prices in the absence of a U.S. program. the domestic quota that is crushed for oil may not be Discriminatory marketing and some representative sold (dumped) on the world market. The result is a price levels for 1987 are shown in Figure 2 which dampening effect on the U.S. oil market. This is the describes representative parameters of the U.S. promajor source of losses for the program but one that gram. In 1987, the penalty for marketing domestic results in a subsidy for consumers of peanut oil.
peanuts produced for export contracts would have The consumer subsidy is small because of relative been $.425 per pound (Point A) based on a national success in applying market discrimination. Average average support level of $.3076 per pound (Point B) government costs have been approximately 10 milfor domestic quota. When domestic use exceeds lion dollars per year during the past five years. Proavailable quota, that is, when the domestic quota (or jected costs in 1988/89 are only one million dollars domestic quota production) lies to the left of point B (Carley and Fletcher). Average U.S. peanut producon the domestic sub-market demand curve, then free tion in the same period approached four billion market prices prevail. Under these conditions, export pounds, resulting in a government cost per thousand contracts might be renegotiated and sold in the dopounds of approximately twenty-five cents. Governmestic market if prices exceed $.425 per pound ment costs are, thus, not appropriate for measuring (Point A, Figure 2 ). Given a significant shortage of the subsidy effects of the U.S. peanut program. A quota, both penalty and domestic quota might sell better approach to subsidy measurement is to examwell above $.425 per pound. Some peanuts at the ine the price gaps occurring between U.S. and world farm level (farmers' stock) sold at a price above $.50 prices resulting from market discrimination.
per pound in 1980 when only about 700,000 tons were available for domestic use. A more likely sce-SUBSIDY EQUIVALENTS FOR nario occurred in 1988 when the domestic quota was U. S. PEANUTS ~2,808.4 million pounds and production was expected Producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) and conto be nearly 4,000 million pounds. In this case, about sumer subsidy equivalents (CSEs) show the change 2,544 million pounds of quota were used for food, in producer (or consumer) revenue due (or cost) to seed, and related uses at prices near support price government actions. Subsidy equivalents may be (Point B). The remaining 336 million pounds of calculated from two sources: (1) government expenquota were sold to U.S. crushers in the oil sub-marditures, and (2) the price wedge that a policy instruket for $. 125 per pound (Point E). Only in an excepment (or mix of instruments) drives between tional production year would crushing price fall to $.0745 per pound (Point F) which is the national good production year, it is possible for peanuts of a average support price for additional peanuts. The similar quality to sell at price levels B, C, D, and E, export and domestic oil sub-markets will remain or even F, if yields are exceptionally high. The imseparate because the United States does not allow port constraint (Section 22) and the penalty price dumping of oil from domestic crush on the world (Point A) keep the export edible sub-market indemarket. pendent of U.S. oil and domestic edible trade. Export edible prices are usually established at To estimate the world price that results from trade world prices which are about $.18 per pound (Point liberalization, the three sub-markets must be aggre-D). However, because of the dynamics of export gated to a single farm level demand (Figure 3 ). contracting, some peanuts uncontracted before the Aggregate demand (horizontal summation of the September 15 deadline and delivered to the CCC sub-markets in Figure 2 ) may then be compared to may sell at the minimum resale price of $.20 per aggregate U.S. supply response and to world supply pound (Point C). Point C should be set above exand demand as conceptualized in Figure 4 . pected world price to avoid delivery to the CCC. Export edible peanuts are usually of a much higher A MODEL OF THE PEANUT MARKET quality than are the relatively small amount of pea-
The wedge between the world price after U.S. nuts sold in the world oil market, allowing the world liberalization and the observed U.S. price is illusedible and oil markets to operate similarly but at trated in Figure 4 and later estimated from available different price levels based on the quality differenelasticities and data describing U.S. and world suptial. However, because of the contract deadline and ply and demand. 4 U.S. prices from discriminatory uncertainty of production resulting in high yields, markets are located on the price axis and a new the peanut program might force some high quality, concept is introduced as the rental value (RV) wedge uncontracted peanuts to be sold for world crush at (Pf to Fp in Figure 4 ). The RV wedge, as opposed to the discriminatory lower price (Point E). Thus, in a the PSE wedge, represents the difference between Discriminatory price schedule the average price received by U.S. farmers and the using U.S. peanuts are subsidized by the positive net price they would receive after unilateral trade liber-CSE wedge from point E to the free trade price at alization, that is, the price that results if Section 22 point Fp. Likewise, the peanut program imposes the is abandoned to permit imports into the United States world wedge as an implicit tax on farmers and a and if the U.S. price support program is abolished.
positive net CSE wedge for rest of world buyers. All The RV wedge models the rent foregone between prices in the discriminatory markets collapse to price the subsidized price that U.S. farmers receive as a Fp in the absence of a program. The RV wedge, benefit of the program and the resulting free trade which is the weighted sum of taxes and subsidies, price. When based on existing international prices, will likewise collapse (average farm price falls to the PSE wedge (Pf to D) overestimates this rent Point Fp) and represents a significant loss of revenue because the PSE price wedge is the sum of RV and for peanut farmers who own quota. The distribution the world wedge. The RV wedge, when computed of revenue losses and gains is described later showby a world model, should be within the range of ing that RV wedge losses are absorbed by a few observed prices paid by farmers to rent domestic thousand producers, whereas the implicit net CSE quota from absentee owners. About 47 percent of tax on domestic edibles is paid in significantly quota is rented and provides a significant data base smaller amounts by each of millions of consumers. for comparison (Carley and Fletcher) .
In this model, the rest-of-the-world (ROW) aggre-CSE wedges can also be based on net results of free gate demand excludes the excess demand serviced trade. These are not drawn but are easily measured by U.S. supply. The United States is not only a price on the price axes by inserting the principal discrimileader, but U.S. quality causes U.S. peanuts to be a natory market prices. The distance from point B, differentiated product (USDA FAS). As a result, the Figure 4 , to Fp (the price after U.S. liberalization) U.S. is expected to both import and export peanuts represents a negative net CSE price wedge paid as in a liberalized trade market. The United States an implicit tax by U.S. buyers of domestic quota. The captures a significant share of current world trade RV price wedge is smaller than the CSE wedge under current market conditions. An expected small because U.S. farmers must respond to the weighted increase in export price would likely allow the average of domestic support price and lower prices United States to retain some of this export market for additional production. However, buyers of oil while lower consumer prices would attract more 158 U.S. buyers than would be supplied by the remaining where all quantities and prices were expressed at the U.S. producers. A significant number of U.S. profarm level, and ducers would be expected to fail or produce other U.S. QED = U.S. consumption of food peanuts (usuproducts with price Fp prevailing for all U.S. peanut ally quota), production.
U.S. QEX = U.S. shipments of export peanuts (usually Since Figure 4 is conceptual, quantities traded are additional), not detailed. However, the model indicates that U.S. U.S. QOL = the U.S. crush of peanuts, production would fall, U.S. consumption would Row Qd = world consumption of peanuts not prorise, ROW production (modeled as very elastic with duced in the United States, respect to price) would increase to satisfy increased Row Qs = the supply of peanuts not produced in the consumption in the United States, and ROW conUnited States, sumption (modeled as inelastic) would decrease very Others = seed and loss in U.S. domestic market (480 little. One unknown impact is whether the U.S. supmillion pounds), ply curve would shift to the right if domestic quota U.S. Qd = aggregate demand for peanuts in the is unrestricted.A significant shift to new producers United States, is not currently expected as there is no observed U.S. Qs = aggregate supply of peanuts in the United interest in new production of additional export peaStates, nuts, which are currently unrestricted. Ford and P = farm level price of peanuts. Hewitt, for example, have shown that peanuts at current export prices will not compete with soybeans
The first three equations specify demand in the for farm production resources.
submarkets shown in Figures 1 and 2 . Equation 4 This model is essentially a model of unilateral specifies the aggregate U.S. demand, Figure 3 . Equatrade liberalization by the United States and it detions 5, 6, and 7 represent the U.S. supply and ROW scribes the magnitude of the adjustment problem that supply and demand schedules shown in Figure 4 . would accompany unilateral liberalization. ImporData sources for disappearance, price levels, and tant questions remain on the sources of the ROW required elasticities are presented in Tables 2 and 3 . excess supply and demand curves facing the U.S.
With respect to demand assumptions, the export market. Are the levels and elasticities of world excess demand for U.S. peanuts is retained in U.S. aggresupply and demand established under discriminatory gate demand and held separate from world demand. policy conditions in other countries? Marketing in U.S. peanuts are believed to serve a unique, qualitymany countries that compete with the United States oriented market so that it is likely that the United features monopoly sales by a central board. How
States would both import and export peanuts in a free would liberalization of foreign policies affect supply market. Imported peanuts would be mixed with U.S. and demand? 5 peanuts under quality controlled conditions and sig-STRUCTURE OF A SIMtLATION RM~ODEL nificant substitution would be expected. All of the demand elasticities used in the model were estimated Using elasticities, prices, and observed supply and in previous studies. disappearance of the key economic variables deSupply elasticities were not estimated here for scribed in Figures 1-4 , the following equations were peanuts. U.S. supply was assumed to have an elasspecified. ticity of .55, based on an estimate for soybeans Simulation Model: (Table 3 ) (Sullivan et al) . In the peanut production (1) U.S. QED = f(P) belt, soybeans and peanuts compete for similar land, (2) U.S. QEX = f(P) use similar capital and labor, and may have similar (3) U.S. QOL = f(P) producer responses with respect to a given percent-(4) U.S. QD = U.S. QED + U.S. QEX + U.S. QOL + age change in price. The parameters of supply were others determined by elasticity and the average weighted (5) U.S. Qs = f(P) price received by farmers in 1987 for production of (6) Row Qd = f(P) 3,619 million pounds of peanuts (Table 2 ). Since the (7) Row Qs = f(P) and adoption of a quota policy, peanut production has (8) U.S. Qd + Row QD = U.S. Qs + Row Qs, been responsive to price conditions. During the contract period, farmers respond to the weighted average pound were commonly observed. Such close correspondence of observed with computed value appears to provide validation of the model as the computed RV is theoretically a description of at least one expected rental rate (the difference between the subprice offered for quota and additional peanuts and to siized price and the supply price at the free tade the ratio of additional to quota peanuts that may be equilibrium). Equally important to producers, the equilibrium). Equally important to producers, the deliverable on the contract. model shows a decline in U.S. peanut production World supply was estimated to be extremely elasfrom 3,619 million pounds in 1987 to 3,041 million tic, particularly with respect to the possible opening pounds with free trade. The loss of 578 million of the U.S. market. During the 1980 drought, 400 pounds of production and the collapse of the RV million pounds of peanuts were almost instantanerepresents a farm income loss of $405 million per ously diverted from world to U.S. markets when the year (Table 4) . import ban was temporarily lifted. These peanuts, A free-trade price of $.1966 per pound compared mostly from China, were quickly and easily diverted to the farm level price of $.18 per pound on the world to the profitable U.S. market. Excess supply elasticmarket would indicate that U.S. exports have been ity was projected to be 8.3 by the authors based on taxed at a rate of $.0166 per pound. All consumers expert opinion of brokers in the industry (Table 3) .
of edible peanuts in the world market have received The high elasticity of ROW excess supply probably a similar subsidy, while world producers were imdoes not represent-farm level production response, plicitly taxed by the same amount. The subsidy for but represents response of world peanut handlers U.S. consumers of peanut oil would be $.0566 per who are able to select additional high value peanuts pound for U.S. farmers' stock peanuts used for oil. from a world supply that is almost 14 times greater Since the U.S. oil market for U.S. peanuts has been than U.S production. Also, in the case of China, the isolated from that of the rest of the world, this model current policy of the state marketing board would sheds no light on the potential interdependence of oil probably dictate diversion ofpeanuts from consumpand edible (confectionery) markets in world trade. tion to export as a means of earning needed foreign Expansion of the model in that direction would be exchange.
appropriate. 160 aThe farm level value of imports depends on their source which was undetermined for this study.
Free trade would reduce U.S. farmers' peanuts for India, and a substantial subsidy in Senegal (40 going into the oil market by 166 million pounds percent) in 1986 (Webb et al.) . More recent studies (Table 4) . About 428 million pounds of peanuts indicate rapid changes taking place in China. A would be crushed, and this use implicitly represents forthcoming study by Miller and Webb will project the destination of low quality peanuts. Although the peanut subsidy in China. quality is not explicit in the model, including the The net effect of U.S. liberalization on non-U.S. demand of U.S. oil, which normally uses lower producers and U.S. consumers would be positive, but quality peanuts, would allow this effect to be re-U.S. producer losses would be much more concenflected in the analysis. In a similar manner, leaving trated than U.S. consumer gains evaluated at farm U.S. export demand in the U.S. aggregate demand, level prices. Consumer outlays would decrease 192 rather than as a part of world excess demand, would million dollars for increased consumption of U.S. recognize that U.S. runner peanuts serve a possibly edible products (Table 4 ). The average per capita unique segment of world demand and that the United decrease in outlay for 230 million consumers would States will probably continue to export near the 1987 be $.84 per year in farm-level value. Fewer farmers level. However, the United States would import at than consumers would be affected. Based on a populeast 584 million pounds to satisfy increased U.S. lation of 19,540 peanut farms in 1987, and a loss of consumption at lower prices. Although not specified 405 million dollars, the average loss would be about in this model, many imported peanuts might be $21,000 per farm per year. These losses would occur forecasted to go to the oil market. mainly in Georgia, North Carolina, and Alabama U.S. consumption of confectionery peanuts would (Table 5) . increase, in the model, by 186 million pounds to 2,251 million pounds, and U.S. exports would re- (Table 4 ). The average per capita decrease in outlay resulting from unilateral trade liberalization.
for 230 million consumers would be $.84 per year in Changes in trade flow in the peanut oil market would farm level value. In comparison to consumers, fewer yield practically no benefits to U. S. oil consumers.
farmers would be affected. Based on a population of These consumers are now subsidized by the dis-19,540 peanut farms in 1987, and a loss of 405 criminatory low prices of peanuts for oil. Production million dollars, the average loss would be about and use of peanuts for oil would fall by 166 million $21,000 per farm per year. These losses would occur pounds (farmers' stock) and prices would rise with mainly in Georgia, North Carolina, and Alabama. liberalization, leaving outlays for farmers' stock (Table 5) . about equal to the $83 million under the current
The major impact would occur in Georgia which policy (Table 4) . Likewise, there would be very little had 36 percent of peanut farms in 1987. A continued dollar impact in the export market. Export prices fall in total farm numbers would likely result. A would rise as U. S. exports fall, and the inelasticity decrease in resource use (farms) by a country that of demand would result in only about $9 million increases imports (peanuts) is consistent with the increase in value of farmers' stock peanuts (Table 4) . theory of comparative advantage. For comparative By far, the most significant impacts would occur advantage to succeed,resce resources released from peain the U.S. domestic market where 582 million nut production are expected to be reemployed in pounds of imports are expected to replace 578 milexpanded export of some other product. Unilateral lion pounds of U.S. production. The expected inliberalization does not provide these opportunities. crease in world price levels would be beneficial to Thus, there must be sontinued emphasis on negotianon-U.S. producers, and the consequent fall in U.S.
tions, such as GATT, that insure that multilateral prices would benefit U.S. consumers. U.S. producers trade flows are enhanced. Perhaps GATT negotialosses would be much more concentrated than U.S.
tions would be better received if more specific ecoconsumer gains evaluated at farm level prices. Connomic analysis of multilateral effects could be sumer outlays would decrease 192 million dollars provided to negotiators.
